

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

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Remarks: I understand that Ray Baine is also interested in the attached. If you see no objection, would you please advise Baine.

Record of conversation between Sir Anthony Eden and the
Soviet Charge d'Affaires on February 2, 1955

I asked the Soviet Charge d'Affaires to call on
February 2. I said I was glad to note from Mr. Molotov's
message that the Soviet Government seemed to be in
agreement with us on a number of points. I suggested
that we should concentrate on our points of agreement
while admitting the differing views and interests of
our respective allies.

I expressed the hope that the Soviet Government
would be using their influence to persuade the Chinese
to go to New York. I also urged that all should agree
that the discussions in the Security Council should aim
at the single objective of stopping the fighting, without
prejudice to the longterm claims of either side.

I added that once the fighting was stopped this
would as a practical matter increase the possibility of
adjustment of the other problems of the area, none of
which could be settled by fighting. I was sure that the
United States Government understood and accepted this,
and that they were using all their influence with Chiang
Kai-shek to ensure that he accepts it too. Much depended
on its acceptance by the Chinese Government also.

The Soviet Charge d'Affaires did not dissent and
undertook to report to his Government.

R2

British Embassy,
Washington, D.C.

5th February 1955

Message from Mr. Trevelyan in Peking dated Feb. 2.

Following is brief analysis of the Chinese attitude on the general Formosan question:-

- (a) their basic point is that Formosa is Chinese territory, and that the whole situation should, therefore, be an internal question. It is a national issue on which we can expect no open bargaining or compromise of principles. As Chou En-lai said: "It is a matter of sovereignty; therefore we cannot change our policy".
- (b) they regard the tension as caused only by American intervention, and to be relaxed only by the cessation of such intervention.
- (c) their anger against us is primarily due to our views on the status of Formosa, which causes them to believe that we are leading up to a recognition of two Chinas.
- (d) they do not regard the Formosa Treaty, or the American statements that it is defensive, as moderate or restrained, since on their basic premise the treaty amounts to the occupation of Chinese territory.
- (e) it follows also from their basic premise, that they will not deal with the islands separately from Formosa.
- (f) they are probably confident that they could deal with Chiang Kai-shek if he were not supported by the Americans, but may still have genuine doubts about the American intentions. They would not, therefore, accept the provision for previous consultation in the Exchange of Notes as providing a reliable safeguard for them.
- (g) even if they are not sincere when they allege that the Americans plan to help Chiang Kai-shek "resume his reign", they will not feel internally secure so long as a "free China" exists under American protection. They would endorse the view of "The Times" Washington correspondent that "it is the United States Government's view that the Nationalists have a continuing role to play in the internal divisions and unrest that must beset any Communist regime."
- (h) they note that Chiang Kai-shek shares their basic position that Formosa is Chinese territory, and they will not recognise him as one of the parties to an international dispute.

- 2 -

- (1) they threaten to invade Formosa, and Chiang Kai-shek threatens to invade the mainland. They have captured an island from him, and he has recaptured a number of islands from them. They bomb the islands, and he bombs the mainland and islands which they occupy. They regard foreign comments on this situation as discriminatory, on the grounds that nothing is said when the Nationalists attack or threaten them from a portion of what they consider their territory, in which the Nationalists are protected by the United States, whereas when they take what they consider police action against the remnants of a defeated party, this is represented as provocative action and a threat to international peace.

Record of conversation between H.M.Ambassador in Moscow
and Mr.Molotov on the 4th February, 1955.

Molotov sent for me this afternoon and asked me if I had had a report of your conversation with Soviet Charge d'Affaires, and also if I had seen Chou En-lai's reply to the Secretary General. I said I had.

Molotov then read to me a statement, the text of which is attached. You will see that essence of it is that Soviet Government recognise that in view of Chinese reply there is nothing to be done at United Nations, and therefore propose the summoning of a conference in the course of this month in Shanghai or New Delhi of representatives of United States, Chinese Peoples Republic, United Kingdom, U.S.S.R., France, India, Burma, Pakistan, Ceylon and Indonesia. It is suggested that this Conference should be summoned by Her Majesty's Government, the Soviet Government and the Indian Government.

After reading this statement Molotov said he only wished to add that he was making a similar communication to the Indian Charge d'Affaires here today. He said that preliminary consultation with the Chinese Government had led him to believe that they would not refuse to consider this invitation.

I asked Molotov whether Soviet Government intended to publish this communication. He said that if he had correctly interpreted the sense of your conversation with Soviet Charge d'Affaires you would prefer it not to be published, and that therefore Soviet Government did not intend to do so.

I said this was a very interesting communication which I would of course transmit to you at once.

B

British Embassy,
Washington, D.C.

5th February 1955

Rough Translation of Mr. Molotov's Statement.

In connexion with the demarche made by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Britain, Mr. Eden, on February 2nd to the Charge d'Affaires of the U.S.S.R. Mr. Belokhovostikhov, the Soviet Government considers it necessary to state the following.

As was pointed out in their statement of January 31st, the Soviet Government, like the British Government, are concerned at the dangerous position which has arisen in the area of Taiwan and other islands situated off the mainland of China. The position which has arisen threatens the maintenance of peace and increases the danger of new war.

The Soviet Government considers that the reason for the position which has arisen there lies in the fact that the U.S.A., with the help of Chiang Kai-shek, seized several years ago the island of Taiwan which belongs to China, the Pescadore Islands and several other Chinese islands. Recently the United States of America have undertaken new aggressive actions in this area which have even more increased the state of tension there.

This found its expression in the unprovoked armed attack on towns and shore districts of China on the part of the armed forces controlled by the United States, in the concentration of United States Naval and Air forces in the above mentioned districts, and also in the official statements of United States politicians, containing the threat of the use of armed force against the Chinese Peoples Republic.

In order to eliminate the dangerous situation which has arisen in the area of the island of Taiwan as a result of the interference of the United States in the internal affairs of China and of the recent increase in the aggressive actions of the United States against the Chinese Peoples Republic, the Soviet Government brought before the Security Council the question "concerning the aggressive action of the United States of America in relation to the Chinese Peoples Republic in the area of Taiwan and other islands of China". By this proposal the Soviet Government tried to assist a settlement of the position in the area of Taiwan and the strengthening of peace in the Far East.

Placing this question before the Security Council the Soviet Government proposed that a representative of the Central People's Government of the Chinese Peoples Republic should be invited to take part in the Council as a legal representative of China and that the representative of Chiang Kai-shek illegally occupying a place in the United Nations should be removed from the Security Council.

As is clear from the answer of the Government of the Chinese Peoples Republic transmitted through the Secretary General of the United Nations Organization, they agreed to take part in

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consideration of the question laid by the Soviet Union before the Security Council on the condition that the representative of Chiang Kai-shek would be removed from the Security Council and that the representative of the Chinese Peoples Republic would be present in the Security Council as the legal representative of China. The unwillingness of the United States of America and also of Britain, which is clear from the statement of the British Government and from the position occupied by their representative in the Security Council, to reckon with this just and legal demand of the Chinese Peoples Republic renders impossible a legal and impartial consideration in the Security Council of the question of the situation in the area of Taiwan and other Chinese islands, and the taking by it of appropriate measures for the reduction of tension in this area and for the protection of the national rights of the Chinese Peoples Republic.

Following the aim of a strengthening of peace and hope of peace, and of a reduction of international tension in the Far East, the Soviet Government consider that in the circumstances which have arisen it is expedient to try to find other paths to facilitate the possibility of a settlement of the question concerning the situation in the above-mentioned area.

In the opinion of the Soviet Government it would be expedient if the countries especially interested in a settlement of the position which has arisen in the area of Taiwan and other Chinese islands were to consider this question at an appropriate conference. In such a conference together with the Chinese Peoples Republic and the United States of America there could take part also Britain, the U.S.S.R., France, India, Burma, Indonesia, Pakistan and Ceylon.

In our opinion Britain, the Soviet Union and India could display an initiative in this direction if the Governments of Britain and India agree with this.

The manifestation of such an initiative would be in accordance with the wishes expressed by Mr. Eden concerning the necessity of joint efforts on the part of Britain and the U.S.S.R. for a solution of unsettled international problems.

As far as the time and place of this conference is concerned the Soviet Government hold the opinion that the conference could meet in February of this year in Shanghai or New Delhi.

The Soviet Government express the hope that the British Government will consider these views of the Soviet Government and will transmit their opinion.



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


February 7, 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ALLEN DULLES
DIRECTOR
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

I enclose for your information:

1. A record of conversation between Sir Anthony Eden and the Soviet Charge in London on February 2, 1955.
2. Ambassador Hayter's record of conversation with Molotov on February 4, 1955.
3. A rough translation of Molotov's statement to Hayter.
4. A memorandum left by Ambassador Makins when he delivered these papers February 5, 1955.
5. Trevelyan's Comments on CHICOM attitudes.


W. K. Scott
Director
Executive Secretariat

Enclosures (4)

As stated above.

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